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Abstract
Aspects of noticing which are often overlooked are brought to the surface and illustrated by accounting-for three accounts-
of specific phenomena, two of which readers are invited to experience for themselves. These are used as a springboard for 
both illustrating the Discipline of Noticing as a method of sensitising oneself to notice possibilities for action, and reporting 
insights achieved through its use. This includes augmenting the discourse of Dual Systems Theory to include S1.5 (emotion) 
and S3 (creative insight) and linking it to a six-fold structure of the human psyche (enaction, affect, cognition, attention, will 
and witness). The aim is to enrich the discourse in which to account-for incidents as experienced by teachers themselves, 
and incidents observed by teachers and other researchers. The paper ends by distinguishing between measurement-based 
research validation, and phenomenologically-based validation which is part of the discipline of noticing.
Keywords Noticing · Discipline of noticing · Dual systems theory extended · Attention · Will · Witness · Six-fold human 
psyche · Phenomenology · Validation
1 Introduction
The Discipline of Noticing arose as an articulation of the 
sense I made of a lecture by J. G. Bennett (1976) in 1972. It 
took some 30 years for me to reach my articulation (Mason 
2002), based on practices developed, refined, and honed both 
in the Centre for Mathematics Education at the Open Uni-
versity, and through my personal work. Here I want to draw 
attention to some aspects of Noticing as a practice and as 
a discipline which may be overlooked as teacher-noticing 
displaces personal noticing as the focus. I end with a re-
articulation of some personal insights developed over the last 
5 or so years about the structure of the human psyche, based 
on noticing of myself, but often confirmed in literature.
The Discipline of Noticing is foremost a systematic 
method for conducting research into one’s own practice. 
As such it is phenomenological in nature, being concerned 
with the lived experience of the practitioner. Unlike com-
mon research methods based on measurement and statistical 
analysis of numerical data, the method of validation of the 
outcomes of noticing are humanistic and long-term, rather 
than statistical and situation specific. They are concerned 
with the individual, not the ‘average’. Insights obtained by 
means of the Discipline of Noticing are re-validated in the 
experience of other people, not only by whether they find 
themselves noticing things that previously they had not 
noticed, but whether they have actions become available 
which enable them to act differently because of what they 
notice. Their validity, in turn, resides in whether those they 
work with find themselves noticing and acting differently.
There are many definitions of education, but in the end it 
must surely come down to those who are undergoing ‘educa-
tion’ finding themselves more sensitised to notice pertinent 
features, and having actions become available to be enacted 
to which they have not previously had access. This tran-
scends knowledge-based definitions of education, because 
it stresses that beyond knowing-about, knowing-how, know-
ing-when, and knowing-what to do in the abstract, which 
may perhaps be assessed by essays, what matters is know-
ing-to act in the moment (Mason & Davis 2013).
The astute reader will have noticed, possibly even marked 
(Mason 2002), the use of the phrase ‘those undergoing edu-
cation’ rather than the more usual ‘those being educated’ in 
the previous paragraph. For me education is not something 
that others do to us, but rather, consists of opportunities 
afforded us for educating ourselves, a stance taken particu-
larly forcefully by Gattegno (1970, 1975/1988) who coined 
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the expression only awareness is educable. By this he meant, 
at least in part, that what can be learned through cogni-
tion, supported by affect and enaction, is to be sensitised 
to discipline-related features, and to internalise appropriate 
actions. He used the term awareness to refer to the enabling 
of action, and applied it equally to subconscious somatic 
actions such as heart-rate etc., and to semi-conscious and 
conscious initiation of action.
True to my phenomenological principles, the first section 
introduces two opportunities for readers to catch themselves 
in the act of noticing. These will serve as data in what fol-
lows. One makes use of some reported data from a class-
room, together with noticing responses to it; the other offers 
an exercise through which to notice for oneself how attention 
shifts, changing its very nature.
In addition to my own responses I include the responses 
of a colleague, Martina Metz who was kind enough to read 
an early draft and to record what she noticed as she worked 
through the manuscript.
Analysis of that data affords me opportunity to make con-
nections with the mathematics education literature, and to 
re-articulate insights into the nature of human psyche aris-
ing from what I have noticed in and for myself. The paper 
ends by placing the form of validation of noticing in a wider 
context of validation of social science research, because this 
too seems to be overlooked in many accounts that purport 
to make use of noticing, with or without treating it as a 
discipline.
2  Some data: opportunities to notice
Because what matters to me is the lived experience, it is 
essential to begin with something that resonates with past 
experience. I offer two accounts: an incident recorded by 
another researcher, together with what I noticed in me in 
response, and an exercise taken from a Hungarian problem 
book.
2.1  Incident
The following word problem was given to some learners, as 
reported by Orit Zaslavsky (2010);
Sara is 5 years older than her brother David. Three 
years ago she was twice his age. How old are they 
now?
A learner answered that the ages were 8 and 13. Asked 
to explain her method, she said:
“I multiplied 5 by 2 and added 3. This way I got 13, 
which is Sara’s age. David’s age is 8”.
Here we have an account-of an incident (Mason 2002). 
There is no embroidery, no theorising, no justification. The 
account is so direct that it seems reasonable to take it at face 
value, because of the lack of embroidery. It has the ring of 
truth, being recognisable as the sort of thing that actually 
happens in classrooms.
2.2  Exercise
What came up inside you as you read it?
2.2.1  Experiences
What I noticed was the immediate arising inside me 
of a desire to ‘see’ what the learner was seeing (why 
double the 5, which on first glance seemed to me to 
be inappropriate?), combined with a desire to see 
whether the implied ‘method’ would always work. I 
then worked it out in the particular, for myself and got 
the same answer. This made me more curious about 
what the learner was ‘seeing’.
Martina: I had recently been working on subtraction, 
and found myself seeing Sara and David as points on 
a number line 5 units apart. I had a sense of a thick red 
segment of length 5 sliding long the number line (this 
only became articulate when I started to record what I 
had noticed). For the ends to be a doubling it was clear 
that the left end had to be at 5, and that if the differ-
ence was to be different, for example, 4 rather than 5, 
doubling would happen at 4.
These are also accounts-of, as they are cast in a discourse 
which is intended to enable readers to recognise the experi-
ence, perhaps through resonance, but possibly through disso-
nance. They report our lived experience, not emotion-based 
or judgemental claims drawing on technical terms from the 
literature. It is my hope and expectation that others might 
recognise the arising inside them of something similar. 
There are three sets of data here: the students’ report on 
how they reached their answer; Martina and my accounts of 
response to this; the reader’s responses to both the original 
and our accounts.
2.2.2  Accounting‑for the learner’s explanation
One way to account-for the learner’s actions as she explained 
them is that she enacted the first action that became avail-
able: double the 5 and then add 3. However, working with 
Sufi stories (Shah 1964, 1978) has inspired me to look for 
two or more contrasting interpretations of actions, in order 
not to overlook the complexity of human beings. Things 
rarely have simple origins; apparent cause-and-effect is more 
frequently the coming together of a multitude of impulses 
and forces (Mason 2016, 2017).
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A different interpretation is based on Martina’s account. 
Seeing or having a sense of a sliding interval or difference, 
however inchoate, and intuiting that doubling requires the 
slider to start at the same place as the length of the slider, 
leads to doubling the 5. Attention shifted from focus on the 
difference, to imagining it laid out on the number line so as 
to be mentally or physically manipulable.
Another way to account-for the learner’s actions is to con-
jecture that she supposed (whether being explicitly aware of 
the supposition as a supposition, or not) that David was 5 
and Sara was 10. Then 3 years later, they will indeed be 8 
and 13. So the act of doubling the 5 could be a conjecture, 
seen as a trying an example. Because ‘it worked’, no further 
thinking was called for.
Although quite similar to the first interpretation, the 
third is subtly different, and is suggestive of a quite dif-
ferent disposition towards such a task. In the first, the 5 is 
simply a number on which to act, and in the presence of 
the words ‘twice as old as’, multiplication by 2 is a natural 
and automatic action, whereas in the second, there may be 
a ‘sense’ of the 5 as an age which at some time in the past, 
was doubled.
2.3  Exercise
Evaluate
2.3.1  Experiences
Immediate panic; discerning four sub calculations; 
each of these become foci in turn; commonality 
between left of numerator and left of denominator; 
catching sight of a common factor in the denomina-
tor; recognising left term of numerator as connected 
to difference of two squares; discerning details in the 
four multiplications and recognising particular rela-
tionships between them; perceiving instances of the 
difference of two squares as a product (first product in 
numerator, second in denominator); central (literally) 
role of 10 000 then treating it as a symbol and using 
an x; simplifying the numerator as x(x + 4) – (x + 2)
(x – 2) = 4(x + 1); simplifying the denominator as; x(x 
+ 1) – (x + 1)(x – 1) = x + 1.
Notice that for me, replacing 10,000 with a more suc-
cinct symbol made it easier to detect, express, and exploit 
relationships.
Martina: I couldn’t envision big groups; pictured 10 
groups of 5 minus 10 groups of 3 = 10 groups of 2 
10, 000 × 10, 004 − 10, 002 × 9998
10, 000 × 10, 001 − 10, 001 × 9999
(Tankønyviado 1988)
to recapture a sense of how the distributive property 
was working here…briefly wondered why I was drawn 
to actual numbers rather than, say, with a generalized 
relationship stated algebraically…even though I had 
full confidence that my chosen numbers were gener-
alizable).
2.3.2  Accounting‑for responses to the Hungarian exercise
Each time I have tackled the Hungarian exercise, I have 
found myself actually carrying out the difference of two 
squares expansions mentally. The results came into my pres-
ence unbidden, and in the case of the denominator, unhelp-
fully. My propensity to replace a complicated expression 
or large number (10,000) with something more manageable 
(Martina used 10 instead of 10,000) was enacted as soon as 
paper and pen were to hand.
2.3.2.1 Using the  discourse of  structure of  attention I 
started by gazing at the whole, aware of numbers, but mostly 
aware of resistance to calculate. I was holding the whole. 
Later I discerned various details such as the preponderance 
of 10,000′s and nearby numbers. I found myself treating the 
numerator as a whole, briefly holding that, then each of the 
products as wholes, with a brief moment of holding them, 
gazing at them, before discerning details. My attention went 
back and forth between discerning details and recognis-
ing relationships between those discerned details. At some 
point I perceived a property that in the two products in the 
numerator, the numbers differ by 4, whereas in the denom-
inator, they differ by 1. I had an action become available 
(the phrase “come to mind” seems to me to be wholly inap-
propriate, as it comes to body first as an action), associated 
with the difference of two squares, twice in the numerator. 
Factoring the denominator seemed better than using the dif-
ference of two squares because of differing by only 1. I felt 
vindicated that the answer was simple (4).
Martina: I couldn’t quite hold this whole due to less 
fluency with the relationships (this is a familiar “sen-
sation”; I know when I’m at the limit of what I’m 
able to mentally “lift” and my “muscles” are about to 
buckle and lose the entire load); I thus chose to work 
on numerator and denominator separately … I had 
a partial urge not to calculate, but the relationships 
weren’t quite as available in abstract form for me to 
immediately see the entire question as the whole. I 
needed to move from numbers to general in numerator 
and denominator separately in order to see the broader 
whole.
Given that the answer is 4, and more importantly that the 
numerator and denominator have a common factor, I have a 
sense of an overall property, and the desire, however weak, 
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to construct other examples. What can be varied while pre-
serving the same structure? These might involve varying the 
10,000 and the other numbers appropriately, or engaging a 
different fine structure that will nevertheless end up with an 
integer answer. It even occurred to me to tinker with the rela-
tionships between the numbers so as to get n as an answer.
2.3.2.2 Standing back (reflecting upon recent actions) The 
actions of standing back, of withdrawing from specific 
action and moving into a different dimension, as it were, and 
using this to construct a personal narrative, an own-explana-
tion, is a vital component of meaning-making, of appreciat-
ing and comprehending. Anne Watson (private communi-
cation) pointed out that mathematically, reflection can only 
be manifested within a space by going up a dimension (to 
perform a reflection in a line in the plane physically, it is 
necessary to rotate about that line in 3-space). Psychological 
reflection has a similar quality of standing back and looking 
down upon the space of recent experiences.
Thinking back over what happened involves accessing 
and re-entering brief moments, fragments of the entire expe-
rience. Writing down accounts-of those fragments records 
only some of what was experienced. Indeed, writing an 
account-of actually changes the lived experience, which is 
less definite, less bound by the implied temporal structure 
of English, pre-articulate if not inchoate. Aspects that might 
have been fleeting become reified and thus experienced dif-
ferently, while others that felt to be somewhere in the back-
ground may be downgraded or even eliminated.
The different forms of attention referred to in my reflec-
tions, namely.
Holding wholes (gazing)
Discerning Details
Recognising Relationships (in the particular situation)
Perceiving Properties (as being instantiated)
Reasoning on the basis of agreed properties
form a framework for discerning different ways to attend 
to something (including some part of something larger) 
(Mason 2003), but are not intended to be exclusive. They 
happen at different levels of detail, so one particular detail 
can itself become a whole, within which there are further 
details, and so on. These different ways of attending are, in 
my experience, different psychological states. Each is likely 
to trigger characteristic specific mathematical actions, spe-
cific mathematical actions and lines of thinking, and may 
require different pedagogic actions in order to bring those 
mathematical actions to the surface in the classroom. The 
same applies to analysing data, of which more in a moment.
There are close alignments between these five states and 
the van Hiele levels (1986) with the major difference that 
they are far from being ‘levels’, but rather states which may 
be present briefly or for short periods, with movement back 
and forth between them.
One possible consequence of this exercise is that, as you 
read the rest of what follows, you may perhaps choose to 
pay attention to (look out for, notice) what I appear to be 
attending to from the words that I use, and to make some 
conjectures about how I may be attending to it.
The fact that the Hungarian exercise was included here 
may have invoked a bit of trust in readers that there was 
some worthwhile potential, in which case that may have 
sustained some people to resist giving up. Evidence for 
this includes the expectation Martina and I both had, that 
there would be a simple answer. One aspect of the contract 
didactique Brousseau (1984, 1997) is that the learner under-
takes tasks they are given, trusting that the teacher has cho-
sen them carefully, and so that completion of the tasks (by 
whatever means) means that the intended learning is taking 
place. The tendency to ‘dumb down’ tasks (Stein, Grover 
& Henningsen 1996), to simplify them so that learners can 
‘do them’, is ever present, but mistakes task completion for 
productive experiences. More is required of the learner, and 
hence of the teacher. Some sense-making, some initiative 
to think for oneself is also required, so as to learn from the 
experience. This involves a combination of disposition and 
will, in order to overcome obstacles.
3  Remarks about accounts‑of 
and accounting‑for
One aspect arising from the discipline of noticing that 
seems to be overlooked is the precision principle. It makes 
a strong recommendation in the reporting of data and how 
it is analysed.
3.1  The precision principle for mathematics 
education research
In Mason (2002) I suggested an analogue to the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle in physics, in which there is inherent 
and necessary uncertainty about the precision of physical 
measurements. For example, the product of the precision of 
measurement of momentum and of position is constant, so 
the greater the precision of one measurement, the less the 
precision possible for the other.
In the case of mathematics education, or indeed any 
social-scientific research in which data consists of observ-
ers making records in natural language of observations of 
people’s behaviour ‘extra-spectively’ (observing what they 
can of the behaviour of others), it is not the product but the 
ratio of the precision of an observation of someone else’s 
behaviour to the precision of what is revealed about the 
observer that is (roughly) constant. In other words, the more 
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precisely someone’s behaviour is described, the more that 
is revealed about the sensitivity of the observer to observe 
what is described.
In this case, the reader learns about my propensity to seek 
generality, and my sensitisation to the role and nature of 
attention (to see what and how learners are seeing). These 
being foregrounded, there must be many other aspects over-
looked that others may find foregrounded.
One consequence of the precision principle is that it 
behoves the researcher to recognise and even account-for 
their particular propensities and sensitivities to observe 
certain aspects of human behaviour. A concomitant to this 
principle is the slogan “to express is to over-stress” (Mason 
1994 p 176). This is based on the observation that when 
I find myself expressing something to others, whether in 
mathematics, in mathematics education, or in mathematics 
education research, what I am actually experiencing as I 
express myself has much greater complexity that what actu-
ally gets said. What I find really hard is to remember this 
when listening to others: that what gets expressed is a tiny 
fragment of what they are experiencing. Expressing takes 
time and attention,. It therefore both affords access to frag-
ments of experience, and blocks out other fragments which 
pass by un-noticed.
It seems to me to be important, both because of the preci-
sion principle, and because what is expressed is only a small 
part of what is experienced, that it behoves researchers to be 
upfront about the background to their particular proclivities, 
propensities, dispositions and sensitivities to notice what 
they notice, so that the reader can take this into account 
when considering the general validity of the observations 
and their relevance to future action.
3.1.1  Accounting‑for my noticing
I can account-for what I noticed happening to me by 
acknowledging the urge to generalise as a feature of my 
mathematical thinking, an impulse developed a long time 
ago while I was at school. One of my pedagogic concerns 
has been how to encourage and foster this same impulse in 
learners and teachers.
I can account-for my desire to ‘see what the learner was 
seeing’ because of my ongoing interest in what people are 
attending to when they act. What might they be experiencing 
which leads them to speak or act in a particular way? I hap-
pen to know the origins of my interest in attention, because 
despite having lived in the UK for 50 years, people still ask 
me, at the end of a workshop or seminar, where my accent is 
from. I began to wonder what they were attending to during 
the session, and it gradually dawned on me that different 
people attend to different things at the same time, and to dif-
fering things in rapid succession, over time. Personal inves-
tigation into my own attention led me to make distinctions 
between ways of attending, or to different states of mind 
that I experienced while attending to the same ‘thing’. It 
later transpired that there are close alignments between these 
states, van Hiele levels (van Hiele 1986), and the SOLO 
taxonomy (Biggs & Collis 1982).
4  Probing the data
As Italo Calvino (1983 p 55) remarked,
It is only after you come to know the surface of things 
that you venture to see what is underneath. But the 
surface of things is inexhaustible.
It seems to me that this phenomenon bedevils math-
ematics education. It is so very difficult to get teachers and 
researchers to probe beneath the surface of their practices 
and of the discourse which they choose for articulating justi-
fications for their actions. In what follows I attempt to probe 
beneath the surface somewhat.
This section begins by probing beneath the surface of 
listening (referred to by Zaslavsky in the original article 
from which exercise 1.1 is drawn), as an example of prob-
ing beneath the surface of an established discourse, making 
personal use of the Discipline of Noticing in order to sensi-
tise oneself more fully to a typical situation and associated 
actions that could then be initiated.
4.1  Probing beneath the surface of listening
In the original article, Zaslavsky (2010) uses the reported 
incident to point to the need to listen carefully to what learn-
ers say. This is a sentiment with which I whole heartedly 
agree, though it is often easier to observe its absence in oth-
ers than it is to manifest it in my own practice. Listening-to 
what a learner is saying, or perhaps trying-to express, is quite 
different from listening-for what is already in the teachers’ 
head (Davis 1996). The discipline aspect of the Discipline of 
Noticing is about how to sensitise oneself to situations so as 
to enable an action that might otherwise be overlooked. For 
example, noticing a situation in which it would be preferable 
to listen-to what is being expressed rather than listening-for 
what is expected could trigger an action of suppressing what 
is in the teachers’ head, and focussing on what the learner is 
expressing, or trying to express.
It is not sufficient merely to ‘notice’ some aspect of a 
situation. My personal observations have led me to see the 
importance of having an action become available as a result 
of noticing. It is not possible in the space available to intro-
duce further exercises for readers through which they might 
phenomenologically come to similar conclusions for them-
selves. I have to depend on resonance with the accounts-of.
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Because of my focus on lived experience, for me the 
important question to consider is what action results from 
careful listening. For example, currently it seems to be popu-
lar, even expected, that the teacher, who is the ‘significant 
other’ (Stack 1953 p 6) in the classroom, overtly values what 
learners say and do. This is supposed then to contribute to 
a caring and nurturing atmosphere and a feeling of self-
efficacy for the learner.
However, ‘valuing’ the learners’ contribution is in danger 
of becoming a universal which overlays and blocks out criti-
cal consideration. I see mathematics education as a caring 
profession, as do many others (Trigwell and Prosser 1996; 
Goldstein 2002; Mason 2002; DeVito 2006; Noddings 2012; 
Watson 2019). The issue of ‘over-valuing’ is an instance of 
an underlying endemic and structural tension between ‘car-
ing for the learner’ and ‘caring for mathematics’ (Skilling 
and Mason 2015). Inappropriate valuing is likely to lead 
to mass confusion, even cynicism, when the learner knows 
that what is being praised is superficial or simply ‘lucky’. 
Furthermore, it is the actions that need to be valued, not the 
person, just as it is actions (e.g. ‘bad behaviour’) that may 
need to be criticised, not the person. What is most appro-
priate is to value the fact of a learners’ contribution, while 
questioning what is actually said or done, and probing what 
is being experienced but not (yet) expressed. Distinguishing 
these can be vital, because the person can be valued, while 
their contribution can be questioned.
My preferred language for this is based around conjectur-
ing (Pólya 1962); Mason, Burton and Stacey 1982/2010). 
In a conjecturing atmosphere, what is said is usually said 
so that it can be challenged, and where necessary, modi-
fied. Simply hearing myself say something can bring it into 
question as I realise that what has been expressed is not 
accurately reflecting what is being experienced. This is how 
expressing can be a learning experience for the speaker, as 
well as any audience. In a conjecturing atmosphere, state-
ments are expected, even intended to be modified on the 
basis of personal critique, and on the basis of the responses 
of others, whether questioning details or suggesting pos-
sible counter examples. In a conjecturing atmosphere it is 
possible to praise the fact of a conjecture without praising 
or even judging the quality or correctness. However more is 
required than simply the making of a conjecture … it must 
be refined and justified!
Listening is much harder than it first seems, but it 
can through perseverance, eventually lead to ‘teaching 
by listening’ (Davis 1996). It is very tempting to reject 
what is said by someone else when it does not conform to 
what I am expecting or looking for. As Love and Mason 
(1992) observe, very often when a question is asked by 
a teacher it is only when the teacher hears the response 
from the learner that they realise that they actually had 
an expectation, an answer they were ‘looking-for’. The 
question arose inside them as a teacherly reaction to 
something they noticed which came to the surface inside 
them. This observation arose over time when working with 
learners, based on noticing in ourselves the impulse to 
ask a question, and very often finding a potential answer 
already present. This offers one reason why questioning 
by a teacher can so easily turn into “guess what is in my 
mind”: our teacherly selves convert momentary noticing 
into questions, based around “can you see/hear what I can 
see/hear?”.
Teaching by listening is, for me, one of six modes of 
interaction between teacher, learner and mathematics. 
(Mason 1979). In the case of the Sara–David ages incident 
(exercise 1.1), the learner may have experienced a desire 
to express what they had realised. When the mathematics 
(or mathematical thinking) actually initiates the action of 
expressing, with the teacher acting as mediator, the very 
presence of the teacher can help maintain the learner and 
the mathematics in contact. The teacher can create an envi-
ronment in which the arising of a ‘desire to express’ is 
more rather than less likely, by developing a conjecturing 
atmosphere, and by recognising that expounding is not the 
only effective mode of interaction.
It may however be the case that the learner felt pres-
sured to say something, and so an action on the numbers 
which became available was enacted automatically, with-
out further consideration, possibly without anything to 
do with what they experienced. Or perhaps the teacher/
researcher’s question prompted re-entering the action 
undertaken, whether thoughtfully or automatically.
Listening carefully to learners can take time and may 
call upon mathematical experience and sophistication 
on the part of the teacher beyond what appears to be the 
mathematical sophistication of the topic. In the present 
case, algebraic manipulation of the arithmetic shows that 
the learner is quite correct. Since we have no access to 
the learners’ actual thought processes, attempts to ‘see 
what the learner is seeing’, to attend to the things that the 
learner is attending to and in the way they are attending, 
proves quite difficult. The only possibility is to look out for 
incidents in my own experience which in some way mirror 
or resonate with this situation.
Thus what the Discipline of Noticing offers teachers is 
support and methods for continuing to sensitise themselves 
to signs and signals from learners indicating what the 
learner may be attending to, and how that may be attend-
ing to it. Only then is it really possible for the teacher to 
choose and action that might re-direct attention appropri-
ately for the topic of the lesson.
One good strategy for testing whether you fully appreci-
ate and comprehend something is to attempt to generalise. 
In the case of the ages task:
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Denote the gap between ages by g, the multiplier by m, 
and the delay (the number of years previously that the 
multiplier was correct) by d. Then the ages of Sara and 
David turn out to be g
m−1
+ g + d and g
m−1
+ d respectively.
The reported action happens to work when m = 2, but 
otherwise does not give the correct answer. This leads me 
to wonder whether what the learner was attending to was 
actually mathematically appropriate.
On reflection, Martina recognised that
I had multiplied 5 by 2, then added 3. But when I first 
read the given learner’s response, I didn’t immediately 
see why that would give the correct answer.
I had had a nagging doubt that structurally, there was 
something amiss, even though the answer turned out to be 
correct. My intuition was validated by my generalisation.
4.2  Probing Beneath the surface of acting 
out of habit
This section uses an augmented version of Dual Systems 
Theory to link the effects of noticing, and use of the Dis-
cipline of Noticing, to a popular but limited view of the 
human psyche.
The first interpretation of the students’ explanation of 
her method in the word problem, associates the learner’s 
action with automaticities or habits. In order to experience 
this, here is a task that has been used many times but which 
comes from a long line of American arithmetic books:
A baseball bat and ball cost together one dollar and 10 
cents. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? (Kahnemann and Frederick 
2005 p 273)
A book and a pen cost $1.20; the book cost $1 more 
than the pen. What was the cost of each? (Jones 1930 
problem 96 p 10)
Martina, using her slider approach immediately, suddenly 
realised that it is structurally the same as the Sara and David 
situation! On encountering this sort of task unexpectedly, 
most people’s first thought is to ‘blurt out’ or at least have 
come to action “one dollar, and ten (in the second, twenty) 
cents”. This can be seen as an example of System 1 in what 
Stanovich and West (2000) called dual systems theory, which 
was exploited and developed by Kahneman and Frederick 
(2005) and extensively by Kahneman (2012). System 1 (S1) 
refers to actions enacted by the body without recourse to 
consideration by the intellect (cognition). It could be that 
an identification of the difference with part of the overall 
cost invites a subtraction, and that the ‘more than’ phrase is 
simply overlooked (my accounting-for). System 2 (S2) refers 
to consideration by intellect-cognition: the frontal part of the 
brain. If an action can be delayed or parked, S2 may come 
into play, in which the action is considered (cognition) and 
evaluated before being enacted. Momentary consideration 
of my own experience (a use of S2) reveals that this is too 
simplistic. Some people are able to stop themselves and con-
sider (or simply find themselves stopping and considering), 
while others enact the action without further consideration.
Over many years I have noticed that when an action 
becomes available it tends to get enacted. It is really dif-
ficult to hold back, to park an idea or a possibility. This 
aligns with the computer-based metaphor of the psyche as 
an engine with many default parameters already evaluated, 
and in which actions are initiated as soon as the parameters 
have values (Minsky 1986). That ‘noticing’ has alerted me 
to the possibility that learners’ actions may be reactions, 
rather than considered responses, which in turn opens up 
questions about the reliability of many research instruments 
which depend on self-report responses to questions.
The idea of automaticities, actions enacted before they 
are considered by the forebrain, aligns with the notion of 
Systems 1 and 2 exploited by Kahneman (2012), but recog-
nised in the ancient psychology of Sankhya and the Upani-
shads. Many teachers have also experienced one or both of 
the following:
You offer a mathematical task to some learners and 
some or all immediately say, “I can’t do this” or some-
thing similar. Pens are put down and action stops.
You are offered a mathematical task and immediately 
emotions well up inside you and you experience a state 
of, “I can’t do this”.
I refer to incidences like these as the portcullis phenom-
enon, because it is as if a portcullis is dropped in front of me, 
blocking me from useful action (access to the fortification). 
One of the contributions of a conjecturing atmosphere is that 
instead of stopping, it is (almost always) possible to try some 
examples, make some conjectures, and then record these so 
as to be able to return later when a further idea may have 
occurred, and be able to pick up where I left off.
It has long been recognised that the body reacts first, usu-
ally with an action; that emotions kick in somewhat later, 
(Mandler 1989; Mcleod and Adams 1989; McGilchrist 
2009; Kahneman 2012), and that cognition arrives on the 
scene considerably later still (Norretranders 1998; Illeris 
2003). In order to acknowledge the role of emotions (affect) 
it seems important to insert a System 1.5 between S1 and S2 
(Mason and Metz 2017). This acknowledges that the impetus 
to act may come initially from the arising of a strong emo-
tion, possibly through metonymic associations triggering a 
change of state, or through metaphoric resonance with pre-
vious experiences (including childhood or other traumas). 
Access to an action may then sometimes follow, before S2 
gets to consider it. Indeed, one of the sociological roles that 
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mathematics can play is to alert learners to the fact that the 
first action that becomes available may not be the most sen-
sible, and this awareness could be of assistance outside of 
the classroom.
The purpose and intention of the Discipline of Noticing is 
to increase the range of actions that become available to be 
enacted. Some of these may in time become habits, but this 
is presumably an improvement on the previous more limited 
range of available actions. Furthermore, the Discipline of 
Noticing can be used to work on developing the propensity 
(even habit) of parking the first action that becomes avail-
able, so shifting from S1 into S2.
Another possibility is to become stuck in a state of inde-
cision, where S1.5 floods the channels and stymies action, 
when it might be sensible to enact something and then see 
where it leads. It seems to me that emotions are the source 
of actual energy (as the etymology suggests) which is chan-
nelled into some long and well established coordination or 
adherence (Varela 1999) of actions, emotions and cognition. 
Because they may persist and repeat, coordinations can also 
be referred to as adherences between actions, feelings and 
thoughts, and states of attention and willpower.
Traditionally, sets of coordinations or adherences have 
been called selves (Bennett 1964; Roberts and Donahue 
1994) with associated frames of mind that are disposed to 
‘fire’ (Minsky 1975, 1986) or come to the fore (Hudson 
1968). However some people reject the notion of multiple 
selves as they see themselves (sic) as engaged in a search for 
their ‘true self’. Varela (1999) referred to coordinations as 
micro-identities, because for a moment they ‘become us’: we 
are, momentarily at least, the ‘person’ driven by coordina-
tions of actions, feelings, cognition, attention, and will. At 
any moment, some coherence or coordination dominates, 
generating our behaviour and our experience. This corre-
sponds to the ubiquitous metaphor of the human psyche as 
the ship of state (Plato see Hamilton & Cairns 1961), or 
the collection of servants running a large mansion (Jung: 
see Olney 1972 p 110) or a horse-drawn carriage (Gurdjieff 
1950 pp 1193–1119). Houston (1997 p 30) used the term 
polyphrenia for “the orchestration of our many selves—our 
extended health. We have a vast crew within."
There is a fourth ‘system’ or state which seems not to 
find a comfortable home in dual systems theory, and which 
deserves to be labelled as S3. It is a centred state in which 
S1, S1.5, and S2 have quietened down, permitting access 
to something ‘deeper’ or ‘beyond’. This is the gateway to 
insight and creativity, allowing a refined energy to enter 
the situation (Bennett 1964). T. S. Eliot called it “the still 
point of the turning world” and developed the idea in the 
Four Quartets, particularly East Coker and Burnt Nor-
ton. Various authors (Synectics: Gordon 1961; U Theory: 
Scharmer 2007) have indicated ways to prepare for it, which 
is what one interpretation of the parable of the wise and 
foolish virgins recommends. However S3 cannot be forced 
or mechanically reproduced. It can sometimes be experi-
enced as l’esprit d’escalier (the thought on the staircase 
afterwards) when a more appropriate action becomes avail-
able too late to be enacted.
Dual systems theory, with the addition of two further 
systems, provides one discourse through which to report, 
record and reflect upon aspects of one’s own functioning. 
By reflecting-on-action (Schön 1983, 1987, 1991) and then 
pro-flecting, that is, imagining oneself acting freshly in the 
future in some characteristic setting, it is possible to become 
aware of the automatic habitual functioning of S1, and the 
characteristic spurts of energy from S1.5 which activate 
particular coordinations (selves), but which could also be 
used to inform consideration by S2. The important point 
of such work at sparking and sensitising oneself to notice 
more finely and more broadly, lies in distinguishing between 
accounts-of, and accounting-for what is noticed in some cho-
sen discourse.
For teachers this means re-flecting in detail (analysing 
accounts-of, selecting situations and associated actions to 
use in the future), so as to pro-flect usefully (imagining those 
actions becoming available in predictable situations) so as 
to open up access to possible actions in the moment (flec-
tion) in future.
5  Beyond the tripartite psyche
My time with J. G. Bennett in the 1970s acquainted me with 
aspects of ancient psychology. I got the impression that 
Sankhya philosophy could be an origin for the now common 
tripartite structure of the psyche, namely enaction, affect 
and cognition. Through self-observation, as in the discipline 
of noticing, I have become aware of the additional impor-
tance of attention, will, and witness, which often seem to be 
overlooked yet significant aspects of human psyche (Mason 
and Metz 2017). What follows are brief notes on each of 
these further aspects of the psyche. Identified and elaborated 
through the use of the Discipline of Noticing, they augment 
available discourse to enable probing beneath the surface of 
human psyche involved in learning and teaching.
5.1  Attention
Clearly not only what people are attending to, but in what 
way, influences which ways of thinking, feeling, and acting 
are likely to be activated, and so what actions are likely to 
be enacted and consequently observed by others. It is helpful 
to think in terms of coordinations between the way energy 
is released by the emotions, colours thought, and influences 
actions, because these typicalities are often quite stable over 
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time. For example, once the portcullis has dropped several 
times, it becomes a habit. As the Zen saying has it,
Habit forming can be habit forming! (Shigematsu 
1981)
This captures the experience of finding it difficult to take 
up a new idea or to take on a different perspective, to see 
things in a different way, or to think of an alternative action. 
One of the marks of an expert is the way in which an action, 
unexpected by the novice, is enacted. One way to become 
more expert is by developing a plethora of available actions 
(and hence coordinations), which is what the Discipline of 
Noticing is designed to achieve.
Attention is worthy of focus because of the different ways 
or the different states one can be in when attending to the 
same thing (Mason 2003), and because of the well-known 
phenomenon that a teacher notices things happening in 
classrooms that non-teachers do not, which is itself a special 
case of the widely recognised phenomenon that profession-
als notice details to which the novice is oblivious.
For example, initiating the pedagogic action of inviting, 
even prompting, the construction of personal narratives 
or own-explanations (Chi and Bassok 1989; Chi, Bassok, 
Lewis, Reiman and Glasser 1989) amongst learners who 
are otherwise content merely to assent to what they are told, 
is unlikely to produce productive narratives that might be 
recalled and used to inform future action, whereas learn-
ers who are accustomed to taking an assertive stance are 
more likely to have recourse to informative ‘stories’ (Mason 
2009).
Becoming aware of the shifts of their own attention can 
alert teachers to worthwhile shifts in learner attention, open-
ing up possibilities for pedagogical actions to bring these 
about.
5.2  Will
Although many philosophers identify will and attention, it 
seems to me that they can be distinguished. There is some 
aspect of the psyche which enfolds, envelopes, and influ-
ences what coordination-adherences become available and 
how much investment there is in them, how much energy is 
allocated to them. Inspired by my school motto (Velle est 
Posse: where there’s a will there’s a way), I associate this 
with will. For example, I can attend to the value/need to act, 
but not have sufficient will-power. I can even have an action 
become available (to complete an exposition of a mathe-
matical result by inserting all the details, or to undertake 
some maintenance task around the house) and yet not muster 
enough energy to enact it. Thus a learner who enters the 
classroom predisposed (affect) not to engage or to find it ‘all 
too difficult’ has already leaked away necessary will power 
to sustain them through a period of not comprehending 
temporarily in the hope and expectation of comprehending 
later. Developing resilience is clearly an important part of 
learning mathematics, as it is in learning or doing anything 
(Claxton 1984, 1997), in order to set aside past anxieties, 
experience the dopamine rush of insight, and proceed to the 
next task just a little more willing to try harder.
Will is essential in any discussion concerning mathemat-
ics education in particular, but any research programme 
in social sciences in general, because the degree and form 
of initiative being taken matters enormously when trying 
to make sense of and interpret someone else’s behaviour. 
Learners who are content to assent-to what they are being 
told, or asked to do, or who don’t trust themselves, are likely 
to invest the minimum amount of energy in completing the 
tasks they have been set. They easily fall prey to the didactic 
tension in which the more clearly the teacher articulates the 
behaviour being sought, the easier it is for the learners to dis-
play that behaviour, without generating it from themselves, 
and hence being less likely to generate it again in the future 
(Mason & Davis 1989). By contrast, learners who adopt an 
assertive stance take initiative, challenge, and think things 
through for themselves.
5.3  Witness
Being in flow That which observes without commenting or 
judgment I refer to as the witness, as indicated in a stanza 
from the Rg Veda:
Two birds, close yoked companions,
Bothe clasp the self-same tree.
One east of the sweet fruit,
The other looks on without eating (Bennett 1943).
Bennett saw the eating bird as the ‘doing’ part of the 
psyche, which is usually taken to be comprised of enaction, 
affect and cognition, or in less formal terms, as behaviour, 
emotion and thought. The technical vocabulary can be useful 
because thinking often subsumes all three aspects in com-
mon parlance. The second bird is the witness, the executive 
monitor (Schoenfeld 1985, 1992). It is the source of inner 
questioning such as “why am I doing this?”, “is this the best 
choice to make?”, and the like.
The witness, the second bird, which watches and com-
ments, is really helpful in mathematics, because it can alert 
me to question why I am carrying out some action that is 
looking increasingly complicated. It is helpful in teaching, as 
the inner voice that says things like “participants are strug-
gling” or “we need a change of energy now”. It is helpful in 
research by asking things like “am I collecting data because 
I need it, or as displacement activity?” and “ what will I 
actually do with responses to these probes?” or “do I really 
believe what subjects say in response to this question?”. 
Here I have been using the verb saying in a metaphorical 
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sense because it is not for me a voice as such, only a sensitiv-
ity linked, usually, to a possible action.
Developing an inner witness, monitor or executive is what 
the Discipline of Noticing is designed to support (Mason 
2002).
5.4  The integrated psyche
The upshot of these considerations arising from my own 
noticing is that the human psyche has a complex structure. 
We each have multiple coordinations (adherences, micro-
selves, selves). Different qualities of energy arising in or 
associated with affect, flow through prepared channels of 
action and cognition, giving rise to characteristic actions 
and thoughts. These influence both what is attended to, and 
how, providing blinkered sensitivities and trammelled pat-
terns of wilfulness. An independent witness affords access, 
to a lesser or greater extent depending on its development 
and activation by current coordinations, to reminders to 
withdraw from action and consider (move from S1 and S1.5 
to S2 or even S3).
Not only is the six-fold structure of the psyche help teach-
ers distinguish possible origins of behaviour, thoughts and 
emotions in themselves, but it can assist teachers in coping 
with the complex psyche of their learners. Increased sensi-
tivity is likely to enable a broader range of actions, and so 
provide teachers with greater choice of pedagogical actions 
which in turn, may assist learners to shift their attention 
appropriately and increase their sensitivity to notice math-
ematical situations, and so in turn, to act freshly and perhaps 
more appropriately.
6  Validating noticing
I begin with a review of the epistemological conundrum fac-
ing social-sciences concerning validation. Whereas scientific 
experiments and physical measurements can be repeated, 
observations about human behaviour are notoriously difficult 
to replicate, due, in part, to the imprecision of natural and 
even technical language as to what actions were actually 
enacted, and in what specific context. I proceed therefore 
with a series of quotations before showing that the Disci-
pline of Noticing includes a systematic validation process 
which formalises what human beings actually do informally, 
if usually unsystematically.
It is well known that it is very easy to be deceived by what 
one thinks one has noticed.
Facts are theory laden (Hanson 1958)
We want our theories to be as fact-based as our facts 
are theory-based. (Goodman 1978)
The Universe is a mirror in which we can contemplate 
only what we have learned to know in ourselves. (Italo 
Calvino 1983 p 107)
Observation, and even forming a collection of observa-
tions is not in itself sufficient:
A succession of experiences does not add up to an 
experience of that succession. (various)
As T. S. Eliot (1941) observed that, in a moment of 
happiness:
We had the experience but missed the meaning,
And approach to the meaning restores the experience
In a different form.
The search for objectivity so that research arrives at 
‘truth’ has seen social sciences attempting to mimic physical 
sciences through reliance on measurement. The Discipline 
of Noticing provides an alternative way to seek validation. 
To notice is to make a distinction: this not that. That distinc-
tion is then expressed in words, with attendant unexpressed 
aspects in the background.
The important question is whether discerning that distinc-
tion enables an appropriate action to be initiated. Bateson 
(1973) reminds us that it is the “difference that makes a dif-
ference that matters”, or put another way, some differences 
are worth attending to while others are not. The coupling of 
a distinction and an action is what Gattegno refers to as an 
awareness, which includes both conscious and unconscious 
‘awareness’ in the ordinary sense. Humberto Maturana 
observed this close coupling in his much quoted assertion 
that.
Language is the consensual coordination of the con-
sensual coordination of action (Maturana 1988).
Here consensual means ‘jointly-sensed’, not negotiated or 
otherwise. To work on this and other quotations I am using 
really requires the accumulation of task-exercises through 
which others can approach a ‘consensual’ coordination of 
action, and then use the quotation for the consensual coor-
dination of those consensual coordinations. That is what a 
phenomenological approach to enquiry-research involves.
The adjective appropriate is itself open to scrutiny, 
through further observation and noticing. What consti-
tutes an ‘appropriate action’ in any given situation? For 
groups committed to some ideological stance or collection 
of acceptable actions, an appropriate action would have to 
conform to the norm. But perhaps there could be a growing 
realisation that there is no ‘best’ action in any situation, only 
possibilities from amongst which to choose; that what mat-
ters is being able to justify one’s choice of action in some 
acknowledged discourse, coupled with appreciation of that 
momentary freedom to choose.
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The question then arises as to whether the distinction 
and any associated action is part of a self-delusion, part 
of an ideological commitment or underpinning assump-
tion. The only way to test this is to engage other people 
in making that distinction and testing that action in their 
own experience. So the disciplined noticing-researcher is 
constantly (well, frequently) engaging people from outside 
the group of already-committed folk, in order to maintain a 
freshness and not permit distinction and action to become 
so automated that they block out any alternative insights.
Validation of distinctions (and relationships, and prop-
erties) through the Discipline of Noticing requires ongoing 
checking against the experience of others, who themselves 
engage in this ongoing process with yet others. Francis 
Bacon put it this way:
So knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observa-
tions, it is in growth; but once it is comprehended in 
exact methods, it may perchance be further polished 
and illustrated, and accommodated for use and prac-
tice; but it increaseth no more in bulk and substance. 
(Francis Bacon 1609)
As Paul Feyerabend put it:
All you can do, if you really want to be truthful, is to 
tell a story (Feyerabend 1991, p 141)
All research ‘findings’ are at best ‘stories’ that are told. 
Validity has to be personal, through metaphoric resonance 
with personal experience, and metonymic recognition, 
leading to informed action in the future.
“[T]he real trick [I hope] is what happens when the 
stories are set side by side” (Bateson 1973, p. 35).
It is in discerning sameness and difference within mul-
tiplicity that it is possible to become aware of dimensions 
of possible variation and permissible change (Watson and 
Mason 2002) making it possible to learn (Marton and 
Booth 1997, Marton 2015).
For example, the Zaslavsky incident could act as a trig-
ger in the future, to try to put observed actions into a more 
general context in order to test their overall validity, and to 
try to enter the world of the speaker, to see things as they 
see them, to attend to what they are attending to, and in a 
similar manner.
From the Upanishads.
It is not speech that one should seek to understand; 
one should know the speaker. [Kena Upanishad II.1-
3]
Every observation made speaks as much about the 
observer as it does about what is observed.
Reality is not an experience, it is an argument in an 
explanation. (Maturana 1988 p 39).
Ginsburg (1987) rehearses the evolution of clinical inter-
views with individuals or pairs of learners. They arose from 
Piaget’s observation that standardised tests only enable com-
parisons of performance between large populations. They do 
not provide insight into what learners are experiencing, nor 
do they provide access to unusual or unexpected behaviour 
(Ginsburg 1987 p 5). Clinical interview offers that insight. 
Phenomenographic studies (Marton 1981) develop this fur-
ther to consider the behaviour of a small group of subjects 
with the aim of charting the scope and range of descrip-
tions of different interpretations, different meanings expe-
rienced by subjects. This could perhaps be used to prepare 
the ground for more detailed large-scale standardised testing, 
again with the usual caveats, but it is more useful in alerting 
teachers (and researchers) to the complexity of the human 
psyche and implications for practice, whether in teaching or 
in researching.
7  Final reflections
Bearing in mind the etymology of theory as ‘a way of see-
ing’, it seems to me that ‘theories’ in mathematics education 
are ways of seeing. They are sets of distinctions which can 
be made, as part of a stylised discourse. Whether they inform 
practice is another matter, because being wedded to a par-
ticular theory, a particular way of seeing, a particular set of 
distinctions both encourages everything to be shoe-horned 
into that discourse, and discourages seeing differently. These 
in turn form coordinations (selves) through the linking of 
actions, emotions and energy, considerations (cognition), 
particular things to attend to, and ways of attending to them, 
and the availability and exercise of will.
The discipline of noticing as a set of practices are specific 
actions that can be enacted while trying to probe beneath the 
surface of observations and experiences. These can be used 
within any research paradigm or other theory. Indeed I often 
encourage researchers, before they impose their theories on 
whatever they have collected as data, to consider first not 
only what they would be likely to be attending to, and in 
what way, in order to behave as their subjects have done, but 
also to consider and articulate their own sensitivities which 
lead them to notice (and or probe for) particular behaviours 
enacted by their subjects.
The Discipline of Noticing as a research paradigm itself, 
as a way of researching your own practices, provides a 
philosophically well-founded method of enquiry. Insights 
achieved using it can be validated as described earlier, 
through seeking resonance with ever-expanding groups of 
people.
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The Discipline of Noticing as a way of being provides a 
basis for working on oneself, for coming to know oneself, or 
even, one’s selves or coordination-adherences. That does not 
mean that change is easy, nor even, in many situations, pos-
sible. But awakening and feeding the second bird, nurturing 
and strengthening the inner witness, is a significant step on 
the path from birth to death.
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